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#METOO AS CONNECTIVE ACTION 
A study of the anti-sexual violence and anti-sexual 
harassment campaign on Chinese social media in 2018 
 
In January, 2018, the global anti-sexual violence and anti-sexual harassment 
movement – popularly known as #MeToo – had its Chinese nascence. Placing 
emphasis on the socio-political and technological context of China, this study drew 
upon the theory of connective actions to investigate how digital technologies shift the 
way in which feminist activism takes place. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses 
were employed to systematically analyse over 36,000 online articles related to the 
campaign. The study identified 48 cases of sexual violence and harassment 
allegations. Findings from time series analysis show that China’s #MeToo campaign 
first emerged within educational institutions before gradually spreading to other 
sectors of society. Based on qualitative findings from the ten most controversial 
cases, this paper identifies a series of counter-censorship strategies that are 
summarised as ‘cache’ and ‘camouflage’. The study of how the #MeToo movement 
in China emerged, adapted, and grew within an authoritarian context reveals unique 
insights into how connective actions traverse various platforms and cultural contexts. 
Methodologically, this study demonstrates how mixed methods can be utilised to 
study connective actions on social media in China.  
KEYWORDS connective actions; feminist activism; MeToo; social media; WeChat 
1. Introduction 
When sexual abuse allegations against Hollywood tycoon Harvey Weinstein and a 
number of other high profile men in the American entertainment industry surfaced in 
2017, they triggered the #MeToo campaign – a movement that soon mobilised 
around the world, including in China. On 1 January, 2018, inspired by #MeToo, Luo 
Xixi, a former student of China’s Beihang University, made an allegation on Chinese 
social media against her then supervisor – professor Chen Xiaowu. According to 
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Luo’s post, she was repeatedly harassed by Chen during her PhD studies. Her post 
received millions of views, and quickly led to Chen’s sacking (Denyer & Wang, 
2018). This allegation marked the time when the #MeToo movement took off in 
China. In the twelve months to follow, many more Chinese women, encouraged by 
the triumph of Luo’s allegations, broke their silence and shared their own 
experiences of sexual abuse online.  
China’s participation in a worldwide anti-sexual violence and anti-sexual harassment 
movement presented a unique opportunity to research how a campaign that 
originated in a Western democracy could emerge, develop, and adapt within an 
authoritarian context. China’s #MeToo campaign has encountered challenges that 
are unique to its socio-political context. For example, the Chinese government rarely 
tolerates any form of collective action, regardless of its political nature (Fu, 2017; 
King et al., 2013). As the #MeToo movement gained traction in China, the Chinese 
authorities were cautious and careful in their response. Broadly, both official media 
and government agencies acknowledged the importance of improving legislation and 
policies to ameliorate sexual violence and harassment in China (Kan, 2018). At the 
same time, measures were taken to contain the development of the online 
campaign. For instance, a number of hashtags related to #MeToo were blocked, and 
the social media accounts of well-known feminist activists were strictly monitored, 
and some were even permanently suspended (Kuo, 2018; Zeng, 2019). In response 
to the online crackdown, social media users in China had to constantly adapt their 
strategies to sustain the online campaign.  
Emphasising the socio-political and technological contexts of China, this paper 
draws upon the theory of connective actions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) to 
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investigate the interplay between social media and the #MeToo movement in China. 
Alongside second-hand data from media reports and online archives, this study 
collected 35,872 articles published by WeChat public accounts in 2018. WeChat is 
the most popular social media platform in China, with over one billion monthly active 
users (Xinhua, 2019). Alongside private users, WeChat hosts another 12 million 
‘public accounts’ managed by authenticated individuals and organisations. These 
accounts can publish available articles on the platform. As indicated in prior studies 
(e.g. Yi & Cheng, 2015; Zhao, 2014), WeChat’s public accounts now serve as a key 
source of news and information for Chinese internet users. The current study 
employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine (1) how various 
#MeToo allegations unfolded on WeChat, and (2) what strategies were used to 
bypass online censorship.  
This empirical study of the interplay between social media and the #MeToo 
campaign in China contributes to the growing body of literature on global #MeToo 
movements. By operationalising the connective actions theory through mixed 
method analyses of social media data, this study also contributes to the broader 
scholarship of online activism with its theoretical and methodological foci. 
Additionally, the Chinese perspective on how the global anti-sexual violence and 
anti-sexual harassment emerged, adapted, and grew within an authoritarian context 
reveals unique insights into how feminist activism traverses various platforms and 
cultural contexts. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Feminist activism in China 
From the crusade against foot binding during the 1919 May Fourth Movement (Li, 
2012), to the emancipation of the female labour force under Mao’s leadership, 
 4 
women’s liberation is an indispensable part of China’s trajectory toward 
modernisation. In recent years the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has further 
advanced laws and policies to assert women’s equal rights in the country (Yi et al., 
2009). However, the lived reality for women in China is still one of entrenched 
gender disparities. In Hsiung & Wong’s (1998) words, ‘a by-product of such a top-
down approach to women’s liberation is that although Chinese women are formally 
entitled to legal rights, in real life these rights are often compromised’.  
The gap between official legislation and the social reality of women’s lives is well 
exemplified by the issue of sexual harassment, which is still a prevalent issue in 
Chinese society (Pan & Huang, 2013). Patriarchal forms of authority, and the social 
acceptance of women’s subordination in China, foster sexual violence against them 
(Liu, 1999; Xu et al. 2005). In the 2000s, in an attempt to improve existing laws that 
protect women, a number of provinces in China passed new bills outlining the 
specific definition of ‘sexual harassment’ (Huang, 2010). Nevertheless, the new 
legislation did little to encourage women to speak out and seek help (China Daily, 
2010). This reluctance, to a large extent, stemmed from traditional gender norms and 
cultural values. As shown in Dussich’s study (2001), the Buddhist teaching that one 
must endure one’s plight in life, as well as the Confucian ethics of deferring to 
persons of greater status (that is, those who are older or those in authority), 
contributed significantly to the under-reporting of sexual violence in East Asia.  
The disparity between top-down legislation and women’s real experience, as 
demonstrated in the case of sexual harassment, fostered the emergence of bottom-
up initiatives in China. For instance, in the 1990s, China’s ‘opening up’, and its 
resulting economic reforms, catalysed the first generation of bottom-up feminism（Li 
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& Li, 2017). The second wave emerged in the 2010s, and coincided with China’s 
social media boom. China’s feminist movement in the 1990s was organised 
predominantly by women’s rights’ NGOs, which relied on their close ties to the 
government to accomplish their aims (Wang, 2018). In contrast, the younger 
generation of feminists are more grassroots, and are not affiliated with established 
organisations (Li & Li, 2017; Tan, 2017).  
As Wang (2018) points out, while the first generation to grow up under the post-
socialist market economy, China’s young feminist activists are more self-assertive, 
more ready to challenge the status quo, and are better connected to the outside 
world than their predecessors were. Moreover, whereas China’s feminist activism in 
the 1990s took a critical and cautious approach to incorporating Western feminist 
ideas into local gender politics (Hsiung & Wong, 1998), the new feminists are more 
ready to incorporate international feminist agendas. It is worth pointing out, that 
participation in the #MeToo movement is not the first time that Chinese feminists 
have attempted to be part of a transnational campaign. In 2012, inspired by Occupy 
Wall Street, they occupied male public toilets in various cities as a protest against 
the shortage of female toilets (Jacobs, 2016). In 2013, university students from 
China introduced their own version of global V-day campaign, a global anti-sexual 
violence campaign inspired by Eve Ensler’s Vagina Monologue (Huang, 2016).  
Another characteristic of the younger generation of feminist activists in China is their 
media savviness. As demonstrated in prior studies of feminist activism, these young 
feminists deploy sophisticated strategies to cultivate alliances with mainstream 
journalists, while at the same time mobilising public support through social media 
(Han, 2018; Li & Li, 2017). For instance, earlier studies have documented how 
 6 
feminist activists in China deploy hashtag campaigns to reach both public and media 
attention (Wang & Driscoll, 2019; Zeng, forthcoming). While their Western 
counterparts often use social media campaigns to supplement offline 
demonstrations, Chinese feminists have a much larger dependence on social media 
to promulgate their causes. This is because demonstrations and protests are rarely 
allowed by the government.  
While social media has provided more room for feminists to be heard in China, it has 
not shielded feminist activism from government intervention and crackdowns. 
Because of its detachment from state-sanctioned channels, grassroots feminism in 
China has always struggled to obtain legitimacy. From removing feminist content to 
shutting down activists’ social media accounts (Fincher, 2016), the Chinese 
government routinely attempts to contain online feminist activism (and other forms of 
activism) to quash any form of collective action (King, 2013). In order to survive this 
form of ‘state-sanctioned misogyny’ (Han, 2019), feminists in China are forced to 
incorporate contingency and resilience in their media strategies.  
In summary, China’s contemporary feminists have emerged in an environment 
where there are still tensions between modernisation and millennia-old traditional 
gender norms; between an emerging sense of individualism and the authoritarian 
rule of the one party State; and between a history of non-advocacy for women and 
their empowerment by new information and communication technologies. This paper 
explains the significance of the #MeToo campaign within China’s feminist movement, 
and its connections with the broader phenomenon of online activism. The following 
section introduces the theoretical framework of connective actions, and how it can 
serve as a suitable theoretical lens for this study.  
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2.2 Connective actions  
To understand the interplay between digital media and social movements, including 
feminist movements, various theoretical approaches to capture the new dynamics of 
organising and participating in collective actions in online environments have been 
proposed. From the early 2000s, a number of scholars have focused on how new 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) can help to facilitate offline 
political engagement and collective action by mobilising resources and expanding 
the scale of the movements (e.g. Aelst & Walgrave, 2002; Nip, 2004; Kavada, 2005). 
While it does focus on investigating the potential of new ICTs for organising 
collective actions, most of this early work follows conventional social movement 
theories (e.g. Olson, 1965; McCarthy & Zald, 1977); that is, by depicting formal 
social movement organizations (SMOs) as the centre of social movements, and 
technologies as instrumental tools. 
More recently, however, a growing number of scholars have moved away from this 
assumption, and have contextualized social movements in the digital environment by 
focusing on the structural change brought about by new technologies (Bimber, 
2016). As Earl and Kimport (2011, p. 29) suggest, digital media ‘does not just 
supersize activism, it can change how it takes place’. Bennett and Segerberg’s 
(2013) work concretely outlines how digital media can foster distinctive forms of 
collective action, and coined the term ‘connective actions’ to describe the latter.  
At the core of Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) concept of connective actions, is the 
recognition of digital media as organizing agents. Unlike the aforementioned 
technology-as-instrument approach in traditional collective action theories, the 
theoretical framework of connective actions takes a technology-as-context approach 
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(Bimber, 2016), and highlights the fact that new communications platforms can 
subsume conventional SMOs and constitute organisations in their own right (Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2013). One related concept is Chadwick’s (2017) hybrid media 
logics, which suggests that the genres, norms, behaviours, and organizational forms 
of media platforms can penetrate various social fields and shape political activities. 
For example, earlier studies on the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement around 
the world, as well as many other case studies, have documented numerous 
circumstances wherein media, both traditional and new, were deployed together to 
effectively mobilize, support, and coordinate activities (e.g. Lim, 2013; Kavada, 2015; 
Zheng & Yu, 2016 ).  
In comparison to conventional SMOs, the organisational power of new digital 
technology has a unique flexibility to frame and cooperate. First, most digital media-
organised movements depend on a loose coalition between individual participants. 
This allows individuals to engage with the issue on their own terms by adopting 
easily personalisable action frames. To put it in Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) 
words, under the connective actions logic, the networks of actions are ‘dense with 
pathways for individual networks to converge, enabling viral transmission of 
personally appealing action frames to occur’ (p. 761). Second, cooperation between 
these loosely connected individuals can be ‘spontaneous, and supple, and 
continually adapted and readopted according to the goals being pursued’ (Chadwick, 
2017, p. 22).  
One concrete example of digital media’s flexible organisational capacity is its use of 
hashtags. The practice of using hashtags to draw attention to, and to organise 
connective actions is also described as ‘hashtag activism’ (Clark, 2016; Williams, 
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2015; Yang, 2016). From #BlackLivesMatter to #MeToo, hashtags now function as 
organising agents in various discursive protests online. Because hashtags are highly 
personalisable and localisable, they can constantly evolve and adapt as connective 
actions expand. Hence, hashtags can be considered as what Bennett and Segerberg 
theorise as ‘representative symbols of personalised action frames’ (Pond & Lewis, 
2017, p. 217). Likewise, Papacharissi (2016) describes the hashtags used in online 
connective actions as signifiers that are ‘open to definition, redefinition, and re-
appropriation’ (p. 308).  
Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) theory of connective actions has its limitations, 
however. For example, both Karpf (2014) and Kavada (2015) point out that this 
theory overlooks the significance of core members who denote deep, time-intensive 
participation. Other critics of the theory (e.g. Condes & Schucher, 2013; Lim, 2013; 
Morozov, 2011) suggest that what Bennett and Segerberg (2013) describe as 
‘connective actions’ are often short-lived, unsustainable, and have limited influence 
on offline events. Although these are valid criticisms, how activism can, or should be 
effectively organised is contextually specific. The logic of connective actions, 
therefore, is considered a suitable theoretical lens through which to study feminist 
activism in an authoritarian state such as China.  
First of all, given China’s particular socio-political environment, feminist activism can 
rarely develop into large-scale coercive collective actions. Like other oppressive 
political systems, where conventional SMOs are tightly restricted or non-existent and 
where mass media is tightly controlled, activism relies on unique action tactics and 
requires constant negotiation (Yang, 2009; Zeng et al., 2017). In this context, new 
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communication technologies serve as a critical, and sometimes sole, conduit through 
which activists can organise both online and offline activities (Zhou, 2009). 
Moreover, for feminist activism to survive in a repressive environment, flexible action 
frames are critical. In the case of China, such flexibility is related to resilience and 
sustainability, because a unified and coercive action frame is an easy target for a 
party-state’s suppression. For this reason, most online activism in China is 
fragmented and in a state of constant adaptation (Sima, 2011; Zeng, 2019). For 
instance, activists in China often need to adopt various communication strategies to 
evade censorship. A variety of these strategies are documented in prior research of 
social media in China. For example, in her study of journalistic practice, Xu (2015) 
outlines strategies employed by Chinese journalists to bypass online censorship; 
these include the use of homophones to replace sensitive words, and the de-
verifying of social media profiles to disguise identity. Mina (2014) and Yang (2016) 
also highlight the efficacy of using memes, such as humorous puns and visual 
images, to express political criticism and dissent under the suppressive Chinese 
media system.  
Considering the factors discussed above, conventional approaches to theorising 
collective actions have their limitations in capturing the ad-hoc and spontaneous 
characteristics of feminist activism in China. Using connective actions as the 
theoretical lens, this study examined how various anti-sexual violence allegations 
were communicated online during the #MeToo campaign. To this end, the following 
question was asked: 
RQ1: How did various #MeToo allegations unfold on WeChat ? 
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The use of creative tactics to counteract censorship is a significant component of a 
civic culture, and sustains online connective actions in China (Meng, 2011; Yang, 
2014). As previously mentioned, feminist activism has long been a target of the 
Chinese authorities’ online crackdown (Wang & Driscoll, 2019), and #MeToo 
campaigns have also encountered harsh censorship since #MeToo’s launch in China 
in 2018. Therefore, this study also examined how activists interplay with censorship; 
thus, the following question was posed:  
RQ2: How are various strategies used to bypass online censorship? 
3. Methods  
3.1 Data collection  
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese #MeToo campaign began on 1 January 2018, 
when Luo Xixi made her open allegation. For this reason, this study set this date as 
the starting point for data collection, and its end point was set at 31 December, 2018. 
This timeframe allowed the study enough data to cover the development of #MeToo 
in China throughout 2018. Because WeChat does not have application programming 
interfaces (APIs), web-crawlers are commonly used to collect data for academic 
research accounts (Fu, 2018). For this study, therefore, a web-crawler was 
developed to retrieve WeChat articles from a third party search engine – Sogou 
(sogou.com) – where historical WeChat posts from public accounts are archived. 
The crawler visited and sent the search query ‘性骚扰’ and ‘性侵’ (‘sexual harassment’ 
and ‘sexual assault’) to Sogou. Moreover, using the search engine’s time filter 
function, the crawler collected up to 1001 articles that were most relevant to the 
                                                 
1 Sogou’s search results are mostly ranked by relevance. Therefore, to minimize the amount of ‘false 
positive’ data collected, I set 100 as the upper limit. Also, to access to more than 100 results for each 
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search term from each day of the timeframe. In total, 35,872 WeChat articles were 
collected. 
It is worth noting that not all articles in the dataset are related to the #MeToo 
movement in China, so more specific keywords (such as names of individuals 
involved in a reported #MeToo incident) were used to select content related to 
individual cases. To develop a robust list of all reported #MeToo cases in China, this 
study also collected second hand data from media reports in both established news 
outlets and online archives. Online #MeToo campaign archives were established to 
aggregate activists and journalists’ reports related to #MeToo in China. The same 
time frame (1 January-31 December, 2018) was used to collect these media articles. 
In total, 125 articles were collected manually. 
3.2 Analysis 
This study employed mixed methods; that is, quantitative and qualitative approaches 
were both used to answer the two research questions. To begin with, the study used 
a two-step analysis procedure to explore how various allegations unfolded on 
WeChat (RQ1). As the first step, a qualitative documentation analysis of media 
reports was conducted to develop a list of reported #MeToo allegations. In total, 62 
cases were identified. Based on these cases, to identify related content from the 
WeChat dataset, the author developed a list of keywords, such as names of the 
individuals involved in each allegation. From the WeChat dataset, articles specifically 
related to each of 48 individual cases of sexual abuse allegations were separately 
selected.  
                                                 
search request, visitors were required to log in. For ethical considerations, I restricted the data 
collection to data that was accessible to the public without the need to log in. 
 13 
In the second step of the analysis, each of these subsets of WeChat data was used 
for time-series and sentiment analysis. The National Taiwan University Semantic 
Dictionary (NTUSD) was used to conduct a sentiment analysis of the articles 
collected. Two sentiment metrics were calculated for each article: positive sentiment 
ratio, and negative sentiment ratio. Positive sentiment ratio is calculated by dividing 
the number of positive words by the number of morphemes extracted from the 
tokenized version of an article; meanwhile, negative sentiment ratio is calculated by 
dividing the number of negative words by the number of morphemes. 
The rationale for the use of sentiment analysis was the need to gain a general 
understanding of the public’s emotional response to various #MeToo stories. 
Emotion is an important aspect of connective actions, as it sparks the motivation to 
participate in such action (Van Zomeren & Lyer, 2009). For decades, in both 
theoretical and empirical studies, scholars have identified anger as an ‘action-
oriented emotion’ (Mackie et al., 2000; Montada & Schneider, 1989) – a key 
predictor of individuals’ participation and support for collective action (Lyer et al., 
2007; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Therefore, the emotion measure assisted the 
study’s interpretation of the time series and qualitative findings. This interpretation, in 
turn, helped to build a more complete picture of the emergence and development of 
the #MeToo campaign.  
To study the anti-censorship strategies used in #MeToo (RQ2), the ten most 
controversial cases were selected for qualitative analysis. Two quantitative 
measures were used to select these ten cases: prevalence and outrage. The former 
was measured by the number of related articles in the WeChat dataset, and the 
latter by the level of negative sentiment expressed in these articles. As shown in the 
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relevant literature, popular and outrageous content is also more prone to censorship 
(King et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2013). Therefore, a focus on these ten cases was more 
likely to provide anti-censorship content. 
The selected cases are presented in Figure 1. To interrogate how various strategies 
were used to bypass online censorship, an in-depth qualitative analysis of media 
content and WeChat posts related to the ten cases, was conducted. 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
4. Findings  
4.1 Campaign development  
From the WeChat dataset, 48 cases of sexual abuse allegations were identified. 
These cases emerged from four social sectors: education (N=27); media (N=10); 
civil society (N=7); and the business sector (N=4). The stacked area graph in Figure 
2 shows the percentage of articles related to #MeToo allegations from these four 
sectors (Figure 1). Figure 2 also shows the positive and negative sentiment ratios for 
articles related to the cases from each sector.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Education sector  
As the time series analysis shows, throughout the first seven months of 2018, 
#MeToo stories in China almost exclusively came from educational institutions. 
During this time, over 20 allegations against university professors in China were 
made by current and former graduate students.  
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As discussed in Zeng (2019), the reason why universities became the staging 
grounds for China’s #MeToo movement is related to the power structures in Chinese 
educational institutions and the international network of graduate students in China. 
China has a long tradition of valuing education, and students are expected to have 
total respect and obedience in all circumstances (Bush & Qiang, 2000). This power 
imbalance, together with documented corruption in the Chinese education system 
(Yang, 2015), makes Chinese universities more prone to abuse. Another factor 
driving the proliferation of #MeToo in Chinese universities is the increasingly 
internationalised network of graduate students and alumni. The vast number of 
Chinese students living overseas (MOE, 2018) – especially those in North America – 
may be among the first Chinese citizens exposed to #MeToo movements. Some of 
these individuals made a crucial contribution to the evolution of #MeToo in their 
home country. For example, a number of the pioneers of the #MeToo campaign on 
Chinese social media (including Luo Xixi) were students based in the US and 
Canada (Denyer and Wang, 2018).  
In the wake of the series of allegations of sexual abuse on campuses, both the 
Ministry of Education and individual universities agreed to develop anti-sexual 
harassment mechanisms to protect students (Zhou and Zheng, 2018). Positive 
reports of government officials’ response to university activists contributed to the 
positive emotion captured in the sentiment analysis. As shown in Figure 2, in terms 
of positive sentiment, cases against university professors scored the highest. As 
suggested by the qualitative analysis of the sampled articles, articles with the highest 
positive sentiment ratio were mostly those that discussed these progressive policy 
changes. 
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Civil Society  
In the second stage of the campaign in China – June 2018 onwards – #MeToo 
spread to the civil society sector. By the end of 2018, seven well-known personalities 
in Chinese NGOs were accused of sexual harassment or sexual assault. Accused 
individuals included leaders of prominent NGOs, and a high profile Buddhist monk. 
As in the case of allegations made by university students, sexual violence allegations 
against these individuals were made on social media by women who were formerly 
employed by, or worked with them. 
The highest level of outrage (measured by negative sentiment) was observed in 
articles related to these sexual abuse allegations in civil society organisations (mean 
negative ratio=0.0758). Qualitative readings of sample articles from this group show 
that the controversies around them were particularly inflammatory. This high level of 
negative sentiment is not surprising as these individuals were supposedly moral 
exemplars in Chinese society. As the public account @Gongyiwangxi wrote in her 
WeChat article:  
Public welfare organisations are supposed to be the purest and cleanest field. 
The recent dirty and despicable scandals make the public start to reflect: some 
so-called public welfare organizations are nothing more than self-interested 
gangs… It’s time to tear open the aura of these charity celebrities and reveal their 
ferocious faces! Let’s make these scums understand: without personal morality, 
there is no place for them to work on public welfare! [See Figure 4, translated by 
author] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Media industry  
During the same period when allegations from civilian society emerged, ten 
individuals from media industries were also accused of sexual assault. Among those 
accused was a high-profile host of China’s Central Television (CCTV) – Zhu Jun. As 
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one of the most prominent CCTV presenters, Zhu had been long regarded as a 
respected public figure. In August 2018, Xuanzi – a former intern of CCTV – shared 
on social media that she was sexually assaulted by Zhu when she worked with him. 
Because Zhu was one of the most prominent presenters of the state broadcaster, 
this allegation against him was highly controversial and sensitive. As is further 
discussed below, Xuanzi’s efforts to share her story were met with stringent 
censorship. 
Business Sector  
In the business sector, there were four identified #MeToo cases from the WeChat 
dataset. The most widely discussed case from this category was an allegation 
against Liu Qiangdong, an e-commerce tycoon. Over 700 articles related to this case 
were found. The initial allegation was made by a Chinese college student at the 
University of Minnesota, who filed a lawsuit in the US accusing Liu of rape. The 
allegation went public in China around September 2018, in the midst of the country’s 
#MeToo movement. Therefore, it was discussed in conjunction with many other 
#MeToo stories that were breaking or developing in China. This case also received 
widespread attention because both Liu and his wife were well known public figures in 
China.  
In comparison with previous feminist movements in China, the currently study 
demonstrates that the development of the #MeToo campaign had its own distinctive 
characteristics. To begin with, it is Chinese grassroots activists’ first direct 
participation in a global social media-initiated feminist movement. Since its earliest 
identification with the international feminist movement in the mid-1990s, Chinese 
feminists’ fight for equality has been a constant negotiation between global and local 
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activism (Hsiung & Wang, 1998). Previous studies have reported that Chinese 
activists’ attempts to introduce ‘Western’ feminist campaigns have been labelled as 
‘uncritical imitations of Western culture’; therefore, they are more vulnerable to 
government intervention (Huang, 2016; Tan, 2017). Hence, it can be particularly 
challenging for a movement with a foreign origin, such as #MeToo, to take root in 
China.  
The reasons why #MeToo successfully flourished in China are complex. Apart from 
the technological reasons discussed previously, the anti-sexual harassment nature 
of the campaign, and the growing international network of Chinese feminists were 
two important factors. First, as previously discussed, sexual abuse and assault was 
a prevalent issue in Chinese society. For many Chinese women, the #MeToo 
campaign provided an outlet for them to tell their personal stories. Xuanzi, the 
woman who openly accused CCTV host Zhu Jun of sexually assaulting her, made 
the following statement in an interview published on WeChat:  
I now realise how the #MeToo movement develops and expands: It does not rely 
on men, but on women who quickly build solidarity. If you are a women, and if you 
grew up in this environment, everyone’s body will hold some kind of memory (of 
sexual abuse), of which you can never be rid. Other women have empathy toward 
me, because our bodies have shared memory. My mother can understand my 
story, not because I am her daughter, but because she is also a woman and she 
has had similar experiences. (cited in Zeng, 2019) 
This quote summarises how an ad-hoc bond among women participating in #MeToo 
emerged as the result of their shared experiences and mutual empathy. In this 
context, emotion aroused, motivated, and channelled women’s energy to fight for 
others, and for themselves.  
Second, as findings from this study show, the Chinese diaspora – especially those 
based in North America – have played an indispensable role in introducing #MeToo 
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to China. They effectively utilised Chinese digital platforms to export and localise the 
campaign to their home country. Because almost all major international social media 
sites are blocked in China, the diaspora plays a significant role as ‘brokers,’ 
connecting the global #MeToo movement to the home campaign. The Chinese 
#MeToo campaign’s affiliation with the broader international movement further 
encourages activists in the country by demonstrating that they are not isolated in 
their struggle.  
4.2 Counter-censorship  
Because the maintenance of ‘social stability’ is a top priority of the Chinese party-
state, gatherings and protest demonstrations are strictly forbidden, and online 
collective actions are also considered to be destabilising threats (Cai, 2008; Weber, 
2011). As a number of researchers point out (Fu, 2017; King et al., 2013; Zheng & 
Wu, 2005) online activism, which can potentially lead to large-scale collective action, 
has long been a major target of the Chinese authorities’ censorship. Against this 
socio-political backdrop, it is not surprising that Chinese authorities have cracked 
down on a number of outrageous #MeToo stories (Kuo, 2018; Zeng, 2019).  
In order to study the counter-censorship social media tactics used by China’s 
#MeToo supporters, ten of the most prevalent and inflammatory cases were chosen 
for in-depth qualitative analysis (Details of the case selection were earlier discussed 
in the method section). Strategies identified in the study are termed cache and 
camouflage.  
Cache describes the anti-censorship practice of restoring and hiding previously 
deleted content in platforms that are less likely to be targeted by Chinese censors. 
The allegation against Shen Yang, a professor at Beijing University, best illustrates 
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this tactic. Following the emergence of the #MeToo movement in Chinese 
universities, a group of students from Peking University (PKU) distributed a petition 
demanding that university officials reopen the investigation of a case dating back to 
1998. The case involved a female student who committed suicide after making 
sexual assault allegations against her professor, Shen Yang. The petition was 
rejected by PKU authorities; however, one of the petition’s authors, Yue Xin, 
published an online letter revealing how she was pressured and threatened by 
university officials to withdraw the petition (Hernández, 2018). This letter was shared 
widely before it was erased on all Chinese social media platforms a couple of days 
later by censors acting at the behest of authorities (Zeng, 2019).  
Supporters of Yue Xin devised innovative strategies to restore the letter to locations 
that were safe from censors; for example, by caching sensitive content on blockchain 
and GitHub. In April 2018, an unidentified Yue supporter made an empty transaction 
to him or herself on Ether, a cryptocurrency. This user attached Yue’s open letter to 
the transaction record, in order to permanently cache it within the tamper-proof 
blockchain Ether system. To this day, anyone can access this transaction record and 
read Yue’s letter (See the URL displayed in Figure 5).  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Likewise, a number of users of GitHub – a platform used mostly by programmers to 
share and manage code – uploaded Yue’s letter to the site (see Figure 6). Because 
GitHub is located and operated outside China, it is relatively immune from Chinese 
censorship. Moreover, as it is a valuable resource for Chinese IT developers, it has 
not been blocked in China. At the time of writing, GitHub remains – at least for now – 
a safe space to cache sensitive material from censorship.  
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 [Insert Figure 6 here] 
Camouflage, on the other hand, refers to tactics used to circumvent content 
censorship through content modification. One of the most common examples of 
camouflage tactics is the use of homophones. Because keyword blocking is 
frequently used by Chinese authorities to censor sensitive content, Chinese internet 
users have developed a rich culture of adapting sensitive keywords into 
homophones. As discussed above, such a practice has a long history, and has been 
widely documented in prior research (Meng, 2011; Mina, 2014; Nordin & Richaud, 
2014).  
The use of camouflaging to modify sensitive keywords was also observed in the data 
in the case of the #MeToo campaign. In the wake of numerous online allegations, 
the #MeTooMovementInChina hashtag was censored on social media (Zeng, 2019; 
Lim, 2018). As an attempt to circumvent the crackdown, social media users launched 
an alternative hashtag: #rice bunny in China, # (米兔在中国). ‘Rice bunny’ is 
phonetically pronounced ‘mi tu’ in Chinese; thus, it was employed as the coded 
name for ‘me too’. For the same reason, as shown in Figure 7, the paired emoji of a 
bowl of rice and a rabbit have also become a symbol of the campaign in China.  
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
Alongside homophones and emoji, foreign languages and local dialects have also 
been employed as ‘coded language’ for camouflaging #MeToo. For instance, on 
WeChat, ‘#老子也是# and #俺也一样# – meaning ‘me too’ in Sichuan and Northern 
Chinese dialects respectively – were both used in collected articles. Another 
interesting adaptation of the #MeToo hashtag is #a‘metoo’fo#, a play on ‘amituofo’ a 
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greeting common among Chinese Buddhist monks. This hashtag became popular 
after the scandal of the high profile Buddhist monk Shi Xuecheng came to light. Both 
examples are presented below (Figure 8). 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
Similarly, during China’s #MeToo campaign, one of the accused predators, high-
profile CCTV presenter Zhu Jun, was referred to online as ‘swine bacteria’ (zhu jun, 
猪 猪 ), which has a similar pronunciation to his name. Because of his ‘official 
background’, posts concerning the allegations against him were often censored. For 
this reason, Chinese netizens referred to him as ‘swine bacteria’ to bypass the 
censorship and share information about the allegations.  
Text is not the only target of censorship, however. Occasionally, sensitive images 
related to China’s #MeToo campaign were also ‘camouflaged’ to avoid censorship. 
In general, it is technically more challenging to detect texts embedded in an image, 
than it is to detect plain text posts. For this reason, it is a common practice on 
Chinese social media to post pictures to evade censors. However, as text-detection 
algorithms have become more sophisticated, social media platforms in China can 
increasingly detect text embedded in images. Consequently, more innovative 
methods were used to camouflage images during the #MeToo campaign in China. 
For example, to trick image detection algorithms, social media users rotated images 
when posting them online. Figure 9 displays two examples of rotated images from 
the WeChat dataset. In the first example, an article about the allegations against Zhu 
Jun was deliberately posted upside down, following the message ‘#swine bacteria#. 
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In the second picture, the letter from Yue Xin was posted slightly rotated. It included 
the poster’s message:  
In the last few days social media has been flooded with posts related to Yue Xin, 
especially her open letter, which was constantly censored, but continuously 
reposted using various methods. The tilted text below is an example.  
 [Insert Figure 9 here] 
As introduced in Section 2, connective actions encourage flexible and personalised 
frames of action, because they contribute to the maintenance and reach of the 
movement. In the current study of #MeToo in China, the clearest manifestation of 
flexible and personalised action frames is the campaign supporters’ anti-censorship 
tactics. To keep #MeToo alive, individuals introduced their own pathways to 
contribute to the campaign through modifying and passing on sensitive material to 
resist censorship. However, because the resistance is highly decentralized, 
spontaneous, and constantly evolving, it is difficult to censor effectively. 
Chinese netizens’ duel with censorship is a conjunction of political and cultural 
responses (Meng, 2011; Yang, 2016). This is because their attempts to evade 
censors are driven by political frustrations, as well as by an internalised demand for 
collective meaning making. The repressive internet environment has fostered a 
generation of internet users who enjoy a rich culture of using coded language, puns, 
and sarcasm to express their ideas, and who come together to support one another 
on controversial issues (Yang, 2014). As seen from the example of #MeToo 
supporters’ efforts to cache and camouflage sensitive material, their creative tactics 
integrate elements of popular internet culture, such as memes, humour, and satire. 
These individuals participate in crowd-sourced efforts to keep censored material 
accessible to the connective community, where self-identification as an ‘activist’ and 
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the formation of a united ‘we’ are obsolete (Bondes & Schucher, 2014). In the 
context of China, such adaptability is the key to the survival of any connective action. 
5. Conclusion   
This paper provides insights into China’s home-grown #MeToo movement, with 
particular emphasises on the technological and geopolitical context of the country. It 
employs connective actions logics (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), focusing on how 
digital technologies shift the way in which feminist activism takes place as an 
organising actor, rather than as a mere instrumental tool. Utilising results from 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of WeChat posts and media reports, the study 
illustrates how #MeToo emerged in China’s higher education institutions, and 
gradually expanded to the media industry, civil society, and the business sector.  
This study also shed light on how online censorship is evaded by #MeToo 
supporters in China. Like many other online campaigns, #MeToo encountered 
stringent online censorship. However, netizens’ ensuing response demonstrated a 
crucial aspect of connective actions in the Chinese digital environment. Qualitative 
findings demonstrate the creative counter-censorship strategies used during the 
campaign to circulate sensitive materials. These included the use of blockchain 
technologies, image modification, and coded language with playful puns. Although 
#MeToo supporters’ social media strategies echo the tactics of previous Chinese 
internet dissidents (Mina, 2014; Yang, 2016), the current study has shown that the 
technological barriers are becoming increasingly challenging for both censors and 
activists.  
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The development of China’s #MeToo campaign discussed in this paper epitomises 
the dynamics of China’s grassroots feminist movement. According to earlier 
literature, in comparison to China’s first generation of feminists, younger feminist 
activists are characterised by their openness to Western feminist ideas and their 
digital media-savviness (Wang, 2018; Tan, 2017). Both points are further supported 
by the findings of this study.  
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese grassroots activists’ #MeToo campaign is their 
first direct participation in a global social media-initiated feminist movement. 
Although the #MeToo movement originated in the US, sensitivities around the topic 
of sexual harassment brought to the fore by the movement succeeded in arousing 
widespread outrage and in inciting active discussion within Chinese society. In this 
process, the Chinese diaspora played a crucial role in introducing the campaign to 
their home country. Furthermore, to maintain the campaign in China’s repressive 
online environment, collaborative efforts were made to constantly adapt #MeToo’s 
communication strategies. These efforts were exemplified by the creative tactics 
used by #MeToo activists to alter images and hashtags. This form of crowd-sourced 
resistance was a key factor in contributing to the sustainability of the movement.  
One major limitation of China’s #MeToo campaign was that it did not reach more 
marginalized groups. The problem of ‘inclusion’ and ‘diversity’ has become a 
common critique of the global #MeToo movement (Kagal, Cowan & Jawad, 2019; 
Ison, 2019), and China is no exception. Low-income workers and youths living in 
rural areas in China, for instance, are particularly vulnerable to sexually violent 
crimes, but they still struggle to be heard. As Zeng (2019) points out, because a 
certain amount of ‘social capital’ is still required to be considered a credible and 
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media-worthy victim, the individuals involved in China’s #MeToo campaign are 
almost exclusively well-educated and media-savvy ‘elites’. Due to the widening 
social disparities in China, meaningful change in gender politics requires more ‘elite 
women’ to grow their fight for women’s rights so that it reaches a wider social 
sphere. 
Consistent with findings from earlier research on activism in China, the #MeToo 
campaign appeared to be fragmented. Although allegations against sexual violence 
emerged from a variety of social sectors, there was no cohesive force to mobilise 
China’s #MeToo campaign into a broader collective action. If the global #MeToo 
movement is a large-scale war against sexual abuse (with Twitter being the main 
battleground), China’s #MeToo movement is a fragmented guerrilla campaign. 
However, although researchers frequently claim that fragmentation undermines the 
efficacy of collective actions (e.g. Jacobsson, 2012; Onuch, 2015), this study argues 
that it can contribute to its resilience and sustainability. This is especially true of the 
feminist movement in China and other authoritarian states. Because the party state 
has little tolerance of large-scale collective actions, the organising of a cohesive 
social movement inevitably attracts a thorough crackdown. In this environment, the 
more sustainable strategy for feminist campaigns is to keep the action frame 
adaptable, and to make the distributed core unlocatable. While this disorderliness 
may lack momentum and efficiency on the surface, it accrues strength and meaning 
over time. As Papacharissi (2016, p.321) states:  
Change is gradual. Revolutions may spark instantaneously, but their impact is not 
instant; it unfolds over time, and for good reason. Revolutions are meaningless 
unless they are long. They have to be long to acquire meaning.  
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Figure 1. Scatter chart of selected allegation cases (Each dot represents a case, and 
is sized according to the number of articles relevant to it. Colour-coded case 
categories are: education, blue; media, orange; civil society, pink; and business, 
green.) 
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Figure 2. Time series of articles (percentage) related to sexual abuse allegations 
from four sectors: education (blue); media (orange); civil society (pink); and business 
(green) 
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Figure 3. Mean positive sentiment ratio (posr) and mean negative sentiment ratio 
(negr) of articles related to allegations, organised into four sub-datasets: education, 
civil society, media, and business 
 
  
Figure 4: screenshot of @Gongyiwangxi’s original WeChat article  
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Figure 5: screenshot of the Ether transaction record with Yue Xin’s open letter 
 
 
Figure 6. Screenshot of a GitHub page where YueXin’s open letter is cached  
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Figure 7. Image used by social media activists (Source: WeChat)  
 
Figure 8. Screenshot of images of “a‘metoo’fo” and #MeToo in northern Chinese 
dialect  
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Figure 9. Examples of pictures rotated to bypass censorship  
 
